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We investigate the extent to which possession of the veto allows the president to in uence congressional decisions regarding regular annual appropriations legislation. The most important implication of our analysis is that the in uence the veto conveys is asymmetrical: it allows the president to
restrain Congress when he prefers to appropriate less to an agency than Congress does; it does not
provide him an effective means of extracting higher appropriations from Congress when he prefers to
spend more than it does. This asymmetry derives from constitutional limitations on the veto, in combination with the presence of a de facto reversionary expenditure level contained in the appropriations
process (Fenno, 1966). We find strong support for this proposition in a regression of presidential
requests upon congressional appropriations decisions.

1. Introduction
In seeking to in uence policymaking within Congress, the president possesses impressive resources upon which to draw. There is the prominence and
prestige of the of ce itself, which confers upon the holder a unique vantage point
from which to persuade others (Neustadt, 1960). Popular presidents may translate their standing with the public into congressional support for their legislative
program (Edwards, 1980; Rivers and Rose, 1985). Another, more tangible resource is the administrative machinery through which the president can pursue
his interests on Capitol Hill—most notably the Of ce of Management and Budget (Berman, 1979; Heclo, 1975, 1984; Tompkins, 1985), but also the congressional liaison of ce and lobbying operations (Wayne, 1978; Sullivan, 1986).
The ultimate source of presidential in uence over congressional policymaking,
though, is the power vested by the Constitution to veto bills passed by Congress.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the extent to which possession of
the veto allows the president to in uence congressional decisions regarding regular annual appropriations legislation. Although most entitlement programs and
other major activities of the federal government are funded by means of “perma—
nent” obligational authority, each year hundreds of billions of dollars continue to
be allocated to the various departments, bureaus, agencies, and administrations
of the federal government through the vehicle of annual appropriations.
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Krehbiel, Thomas Gilligan, and Barry Weingast for comments and criticisms. Jeff Dubin provided
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We proceed with this study by rst developing a simple spatial model of
preferences over appropriations and then incorporating into it the basic sequence
of actions which constitute the annual funding process. The key implication of
this model is that the in uence over appropriations that the veto gives the president is asymmetrical. The president can use the veto to restrain Congress, to
some extent, when he prefers to appropriate less to an agency than it does. In
contrast, the veto provides the president with no means of extracting more appropriations from Congress when he prefers to spend more than its members do.
This asymmetry derives from inherent limitations in the veto power, in combination with a well—de ned reversionary expenditure level in the appropriations
process. The veto provides the president with only the power to reject acts of
Congress; it does not provide him with the power to modify these acts. The veto
is further limited by the ability of two-thirds majorities in both chambers of Congress to override it. The reversionary expenditure is the funding level for an
agency which obtains if Congress and the president fail to enact regular appropriations legislation before the start of the new scal year (see Fenno, 1966).
These institutional features permit Congress to act as a monopoly proposer,
submitting “take it or leave it” offers to the president. He is then faced with
choosing between appropriation gures contained in the bill passed by Congress
and the reversionary level. As in the case of local budget referenda analyzed by
Romer and Rosenthal (1978, 1979), such agenda-setting ability gives the setter
substantial in uence over budgetary outcomes. Even under circumstances favorable to the president (i.e. , when he desires a lower level of appropriations for an
agency than does Congress), his in uence over nal spending gures will be limited. Under unfavorable circumstances (i.e., when he desires higher levels of appropriations), he will have no in uence at all.
The existence of such an asymmetry should have important empirical consequences. Above all, we expect the president’s requests to have much greater
bearing upon agency budgets when he prefers to appropriate less than Congress
than when he desires to appropriate more. We nd strong support for this hypothesis in a regression analysis of data from 43 federal programs and agencies
during the post—World War 11 period. Our analysis of these data also supports
additional hypotheses concerning presidential in uence that are derived from an
“electoral connection” perspective on preferences over appropriations.

2. Presidential In uence on Congressional Decision Making
Spatial Model of the Appropriations Process
In analyzing the impact of a veto player (the president) upon congressional
appropriations decisions, we employ the well-known spatial framework (Black,
1958; Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook, 1970; Enelow and Hinich, 1984). This approach is similar to that taken recently by several scholars in their analysis of

PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE ON APPROPRIATIONS

715

congressional procedures and institutional arrangements (Denzau and Mackay,
1983; Fiorina and N011, 1977; Krehbiel, 1985a, 1985b; Shepsle, 1979; Shepsle
and Weingast, 1981, 1985). As is the case with most of these previous efforts,
the model we develop has elements that are highly stylized and abstract; it lacks
much of the detail and complexity of the appropriations process that previous
studies have revealed (Fenno, 1966; Schick, 1980; Wildavsky, 1974). We provide this abstract model in order to convey the basic logic of our analysis as
simply and directly as possible. However, the assumptions we make derive from
actual, concrete procedures and institutional arrangements governing the appropriations legislation. Therefore, we are able to derive propositions which can be
subjected to empirical scrutiny.
For the most part our discussion will be based upon a single chamber legislature with legislators choosing funding levels for a single agency along a single
dimension. We also assume that the president and members of Congress have
complete information about each other’s preferences and about the rules of the
game and institutional structure. We further assume that the president and members of Congress are rational and self-interested. The set of feasible agency appropriations choices facing the president and members of Congress is E R.
The preferences of the president and members of Congress over agency appropriations are assumed to be convex (single-peaked in one-dimensional issue space).
Let the president’s ideal appropriation for an agency be P and a member of
Congress’s ideal be X Let > represent member i’s preference relation; let >1,
represent the president’s preference relation. Member i’s preferred-to set is dened as P,(x) = {x’ E X | x’ >, x}. Let P,(x) be the president’s preferred-to
set, which is de ned in similar fashion.
We need consider only the preferences of three key members of the legislature—the one-third quantile member, the median voter, and the two-thirds
quantile member. We refer to them as members 1, 2, and 3. Without loss of generality, let their ideal appropriations be ordered 1 < X 2 < X 3. A simple majority of members is required to pass a bill, and two-thirds to override a veto. A
simple majority is equivalent to two of our three key members; two-thirds is
equivalent to all three of our key members.
The sequence of actions is as follows. At the beginning of each session the
president transmits his budget requests to Congress. Congress then constructs appropriations bills that contain its choices of funding for each agency. Let b E X
represent the funding level Congress adopts. If the president accepts this gure,
then the congressional choice becomes law. If instead he casts a veto, then Congress faces another choice: it can override the president’s veto with a vote of twothirds of the membership, thus enacting its previous choice b; or it can sustain
the veto, in which case the bill returns to Congress and the sequence is repeated.
If no bill has passed before the beginning of the new scal year, funding for
agencies provided via regular annual appropriations technically falls to zero.

,.

,

716

D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins

Treating zero as a mandated reversion level, however, is misleading, for at this
juncture Congress routinely passes stopgap funding bills of limited duration
known as continuing resolutions. The funding level contained in a continuing
resolution, which can be considered a reversionary level in the same sense as in
the well—known model of Romerand Rosenthal (1978, 1979), we refer to as c E X.
Funding for an agency remains at c until agreement is reachedand new appropriations legislation is enacted and signed.
As indicated earlier, we assume that there is no uncertainty hindering the
choices of participants. Consequently, the outcome in the nal round of play is
known beforehand to everyone involved. Without loss of generality, then, the
repeat-play appropriations process can be modeled as a single play. At this point
Congress offers the president a “take it or leave it” appropriations bill, b. If he
accepts the bill, the outcome will be b. Ifhe vetoes the bill, the outcome will still
be b if his veto is overridden. In the event his veto is sustained, he knows that
Congress will enact a continuing resolution calling for a spending rate c. Barring
other political considerations (more on that later), the president will veto the congressional bill b only if he prefers c to b, that is, only if b E P,,(c). Moreover,
the president cannot use the threat of a veto to induce a more favorable outcome
unless b E Pp(c), as he cannot credibly threaten to do something that will make
him worse off (Schelling, 1960).
The president’s choice to accept or veto appropriations legislation is therefore conditioned on the nature of the continuing resolution. Since the appropriations level chosen by Congress is in turn conditioned on an assessment of the
president’s actions and on whether or not a veto is sustainable, the bills passed by
Congress are also conditioned on the nature of continuing resolutions.
Continuing Resolutions

It is rare for all regular annual appropriations bills to have been enacted by
the beginning of the scal year (Bach, 1985). This happens because the president
and Congress have failed to reach agreement, or simply because Congress itself
has not nished action on a bill.
The House Appropriations Committee, when drafting continuing resolutions, has followed a standard formula with a high degree of regularity for over a
century. As summarized by Fenno (1966), “Agencies are allowed to spend at the
previous year’s rate or, if only the House has passed the appropriation bill, at
whichever rate is lower, or, if both Senate and House have passed the bill, at
whichever of those two rates is lower” (p. 421).‘ Henceforth, we refer to this
formula as the “Fenno Rule” and assume that it will be adhered to in the con‘Technically, the standard continuing resolution formula calls for spending at the current rate
or the rate speci ed in the Senate bill, whichever is lower, if only the Senate has passed the bill. This
situation almost never occurs, however, as the Senate Appropriations Committee customarily uses the
House bill to mark up and so waits for House passage before proceeding.
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struction of continuing resolutions. In the context of our unicameral model, the
spending resulting from a continuing resolution c is assumed to be the minimum
of the congressional bill or of last year’s appropriations.
The assumption that continuing resolutions are based on the Fenno Rule
plays a key role in our model. At rst glance, adherence to the Fenno Rule seems
somewhat remarkable. That continuing resolutions take this form is not mandated by the Constitution, the Rules of the House, the bylaws of the Appropriations Committee, or anything else. They are simply acts of Congress, and in
principle could, like any ordinary appropriations bill, specify spending at any
level Congress and the president might agree upon. This adherence is especially
surprising given that the de jure reversion of agency appropriations to zero potentially confers to the author of the appropriations legislation—the Appropriations
Committee—a tremendous degree of agenda control. The committee could use
its amendment restriction powers to present Congress and the president with a
wide range of appropriations that both would nd preferable to the wholesale
closing down of agency activity.
This strategy works, however, only if the members of the Appropriations
Committee are truly willing to live with zero, which would be the result if their
bluff were called. But this is rarely the case. In general, the threat of allowing
agency funding to lapse to zero possesses the same problem as other threats of
drastic action: it is not credible, since carrying it out would make the threatener
worse off. Conversely, if membership on the Appropriations Committee was
skewed enough to make zero a credible threat, the other members of Congress
would nd this extortion intolerable. Severe sanctions can be applied (and indeed
have been applied) against committees which too frequently abuse their powers
(Brady and Morgan, 1986). The Fenno Rule is a solution to a game between the
membership and its committees: it provides individual members (and the president) with an insurance policy against extortion by the committee. Strict adherence to the Fenno Rule can thus be seen as another manifestation of the universalism that characterizes allocative decisions made by Congress, a norm that
is consistent with the long-term interests of individual members of Congress (Arnold, 1979; Weingast, 1979).
There are also strong organizational imperatives that dictate a commitment
to the Fenno Rule, or at least to some automatic mechanism that performs the
function of this rule. As was pointed out to us by a senior staff member on the
House Appropriations Committee, choosing appropriations higher than the lowest level that might obtain in the upcoming scal year risks committing funds and
hiring personnel for activities that might have to be terminated upon passage of a
regular appropriations bill. This would not only waste money, but might also run
afoul of civil service regulations that make it dif cult for the federal government
to lay off employees. Members of Congress do not want bureaucratic rigidities to
lock them into programs that have not yet been funded in a regular bill. Continu-
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ing resolutions of the form noted by Fenno thus win virtually automatic support
and are in all likelihood veto proof.
In recent years Congress has occasionally departed from the Fenno Rule and
has passed stopgap funding bills that allow certain agencies to spend at the current rate or at the rate speci ed in the House Appropriations Committee report
(which was all the further the relevant appropriations bill had proceeded), whichever was lower. The rst continuing resolution for scal 1982 permitted foreign
aid programs to spend at the lower of the administration’s budget request or the
scal 1981 level, whichever was lower (Donnelly, 1981). Even in its deviations
from the Fenno Rule, however, Congress has adhered to the logic of not appropriating at a higher rate in a stopgap continuing resolution than might later obtain
in the nal bill. Thus the deviations tend to be more conservative than the rule
itself.
Since 1980 Congress has also adopted the practice of bundling all outstanding appropriations bills at the end of the term and enacting them as a single package (Schick, 1980). Although enacted under the rubric of “continuing resolutions,” these omnibus appropriations bills should not be confused with the
temporary reversionary measures we are concerned about here. Such bills grant
funding authority for the duration of the scal year at whatever levels Congress
ultimately decides upon. These bills also suffer the fate of being one of the last
legislative trains out of the station. Representatives and senators attempt, with
frequent success, to load them with as much un nished legislative business as
possible, for example, crime bills, housing and water project authorization bills,
bans on cop-killer bullets, and emergency jobs programs. Not surprisingly, these
omnibus appropriations bills do not enjoy the routine success of stopgap funding
bills based upon the Fenno Rule. They are the subject of long and rancorous debate, are frequently threatened with libusters, are occasionally defeated, and, in
at least one instance, such a bill has been successfully vetoed. Notably, the omnibus bill Reagan vetoed in November 1981 was preceded by and was quickly
followed by continuing resolutions that adhered to the Fenno Rule. These Reagan
signed into law.
Presidential In uence and the Veto
In analyzing the in uence conferred upon the president through the threat or
use of his veto, there are only two cases that need to be considered: (1) the president’s ideal appropriation is greater than the ideal of the median member of Congress, that is, > X 2; and (2) the president’s ideal appropriation is less than the
median in Congress, that is, < X 2.

CASE 1: Since > X 2, the president prefers the congressional median to a
continuing resolution, that is, if P > X 2, then X2 E Pp(c). When P > X2,
as in Figure 1, a proposal of X2 is unbeatable and becomes the legislative
choice, that is, b = X 2. The president will be faced with a choice of accept-
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ing b, or vetoing the bill and getting either b (if his veto is overridden) or c
(if the veto is sustained). Since he prefers X 2 to c, he cannot make himself
better off by vetoing, so he would never veto a bill that proposes b = X2 if
he prefers at least as much as X 2. Thus, Congress adopts b = X2 without
regard to the president’s veto authority. The president cannot affect the appropriations outcome with the use of his veto when he prefers to spend at
least as much as the median in Congress?
CASE 2: P < X 2. The president may still prefer X2 to c (especially if P is
close to X 2). Here, as in Case 1, he cannot affect the congressional choice.
If, on the other hand, the president prefers a continuing resolution to the
congressional median, that is, X2 E Pp(c), then he may have some leverage.
If Congress passes b = X2, the president will veto it. If member 1 prefers
X2 to c, then the president’s veto will be overridden, and the nal outcome
is b = X 2, and again the president will have no in uence (through the use of
his veto) on the appropriations decision. If, on the other hand, X2 E P, (c),
as in Figure 2, then the president’s veto will be sustained. Knowing this, a
bill b = 2, such that z < X 2, will be proposed that makes the president
indifferent between 2 and c (i.e., z E P,,(c)). The choice of b = z is preferred by members 2 and 3 to any other alternative in Pp (c). Thus b = z is a
structure-induced Condorcet winner (Shepsle, 1979). The president is
ZOne might argue that the president has a credible veto threat even when P > X2 if his utility
for c is greater than member 2's utility for c and if Congress and the president are engaged in a
repeated threat game. A key feature of the appropriations process, however, is that it is Congress who
presents the president with a nal “take it or leave it” choice between its bill b and the continuing
resolution c. As long as P > X 2, he will prefer X2 to c at the end of the scal year. When given the
choice between b = X2 and c, the president will choose b. Knowing this, the president’s threat to
veto b = X2 will not be credible.
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able, through possession of the veto, to cause Congress to reduce its spending from X2 to 2.

It is also apparent from Figure 2 that the president’s ability to cause a reduction in spending is limited, since no bill calling for spendingless than y will be
proposed, as y is the point of indifference with respect to c for member 1. If 2 < y,
then y is a structure—induced Condorcet winner that is unanimously preferred by
the members of Congress to the result of a continuing resolution c. Thus any veto
of a bill b = y will be overridden. Knowing this, the president does not veto b =
y (though he vetoes any bill with spending greater than y). In this situation the
threat of a veto causes Congress to adopt appropriations y lower than it would
otherwise have adopted (i.e., X2).
Although the reversionary point in this model is de ned by the Fenno Rule,
our analysis does not require adherence to this particular formula. As long as c <
X2, in uence conveyed to the president by the veto is con ned to instances when
< X2.3 What is important, however, is that the Fenno Rule imparts predictability; everyone knows what the outcome is if a regular appropriations bill is not
enacted.
In Figures 1 and 2 the level of spending contained in a continuing resolution
is less than the ideal appropriation preferred by the president and by members of
the legislature (i.e., c < P and c < X, < X2 < X3). In no way, however, do our
results hinge upon the location of the continuing resolution relative to the president’s or members’ ideals. To show this we examine two extreme cases: (1) when
the ideal of the median in Congress is zero and (2) when the ideal of the president
is zero. If X2 = 0, then 2 X2, and b = 0. In such circumstances, as in case 1,
3Presidential in uence will still be asymmetric when c > X 2. This is sometimes the case. Farm
commodity price supports, for example, revert to levels speci ed in the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act, which are much higher than existing levels. In such instances, however, the president derives in uence from the veto only when P > X2.
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the president has no in uence on the appropriations choice. On the other hand, if
= 0 (and X 1 > 0), the president may possess some in uence. As in case 2,
member 1 is the pivotal player. A bill, b = y > 0, is preferred by member 1 to
zero. Since b = y will then be enacted irrespective of presidential action (any
veto will be overridden), the president will go along with b = y. Thus we again
derive our asymmetric in uence hypothesis.
A straightforward implication of our model is that the president vetoes appropriations bills only when he prefers lower spending than that adopted by Congress. If he prefers more, the veto cannot make him better off, and so we do not
expect him to use it. This expectation is strongly borne out in the historical
record. Of the 18 appropriations bills vetoed from 1948 to 1979, the president
never vetoed one because it called for too little spending. All contained either
appropriations greater than the president requested, or other measures that he
found objectionable, for example, the rider to a 1973 supplemental appropriation
that prohibited bombing of Laos and Cambodia. An apparent exception was Carter’s veto of the 1978 public works bill, which speci ed lower overall expenditures than he had requested. In his veto message, however, Carter asserted that
new starts on dozens of wasteful projects would commit the federal government
to more spending in the long run than he was willing to countenance.

Presidential Requests
It is important for our empirical analysis to consider whether the president
has an incentive to misrepresent his preferences in the requests he submits to
Congress. For this purpose we relax momentarily our full information assumption and assume that members of Congress do not know the president’s ideal. If
he prefers higher spending than Congress, as in Figure 1, misrepresentation of
his ideal upward gains him nothing, as they still choose X 2. Misrepresentation of
his ideal downward to a point below the congressional median, on the other
hand, might affect the congressional choice. But this would yield spending that is
even lower than the congressional median X 2, thus making the president even
worse off.
If the president prefers less than Congress, on the other hand, there is a region wherein misrepresentation may bene t the president. If he is indifferent between 2 and c, as in Figure 2, and the members of Congress know this, they
choose b = 2 (as this makes members 2 and 3 better off than any other choice). If
2 is less than y, where member 1 is indifferent between c and y, then b = y is
chosen. Getting Congress to believe that he prefers more than P by misrepresenting his preferences upward causes them to adopt an even higher amount, again
making the president worse off. But if he can make Congress believe he prefers
less than (and thus that his point of indifference z is also lower), he can induce
them to choose b = y. Since y is closer than 2 to P, he would be better off. In this
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situation the president therefore has an incentive to misrepresent his preferences
to Congress.

Two additional considerations, however, strongly discourage a nonsincere
strategy. First, the only situation in which the president has an incentive to misrepresent his ideal is that in which he prefers less than Congress, and then only in
a downward direction. Knowing this, Congress may learn over time exactly how
to invert presidential requests to discover his ideal. Second, as Denzau, Riker,
and Shepsle (1985) have argued, the ability to misrepresent in the legislative process is limited by electoral considerations. Voters are not likely to appreciate

complicated strategies that entail misrepresentations. In misrepresenting, the
president must weigh the loss in votes due to misunderstanding against the gain in
votes brought about by achieving a better outcome. For these reasons we expect
that the president’s budget requests to Congress truthfully reveal his preferences.
Limitations andPossible Extensions

While the simplicity of our model may be a virtue, it is also a vice in that we
cannot incorporate the full richness of appropriations politics into our analysis.
As acknowledged earlier, the president possesses resources other than the veto
with which to affect appropriations decisions: his ability to move public opinion,
his access to national party resources, his campaigning ability, and his ability to
grant (or withhold) favors are only some of the most important. These resources
may provide him leverage even in cases where the veto per se confers him none.
But, we expect an asymmetry of in uence to persist in the face of these other
factors; holding all else constant, the president still has more in uence when he
prefers to spend less than Congress rather than more.
Our simpli ed unicameral model of Congress does not limit our results. It
can be easily shown that incorporating two chambers and committees into our
framework does not affect the basic asymmetry of in uence. A simplifying assumption that does matter is the restriction of our model to one dimension. Appropriations bills contain dozens to hundreds of individual line items, and Congress will surely use this ability to bundle legislation in this manner to serve its
own purposes. This may provide the president with additional leverage, but only
if it serves congressional purposes as well.
Furthermore, it may be possible for the president to effect trades, for example, agreeing not to veto spending favored by Congress in one policy area in
return for appropriations higher than the congressional median in another. Such
trades, however, are likely to be dif cult to enforce and limited to the extent his
preferences give him the leverage he needs to bargain with. His in uence, all else
contant, is still asymmetric. These additional considerations, then, might compromise our ability to detect the asymmetry in appropriations outcomes, but they
do not undermine the basic hypothesis of asymmetric in uence.
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3. Congressional Appropriations and the Electoral Connection
The most important proposition derived from our model is that the president
is able to exert substantially more in uence upon congressional decisions when
he prefers to appropriate less, rather than more, to an agency than Congress
does. So far, however, our theory has been couched in terms of ideal points.
Even though we have argued that the president will not misrepresent his preferences, the problem of not observing members’ ideal points still remains. Fortunately, we are able to infer, from the president’s requests and nal agency appropriations passed by Congress and signed by the president, which branch truly
prefers lower spending, and thus which enjoys a strategic advantage. First, if the
president’s request (as submitted by the Of ce of Management and Budget)
for agency i in year t, EST,.,, is greater than the nal agency appropriations,
APP", we conclude that the president did not in uence the choice of APP,,. That
is, EST" > APP" implies P > X 2.
The easiest way to see that this is true is to rst suppose that it is false, that
is, that EST,, > APP,-,, but P < X 2. As we have shown, the bill passed by Congress, b, must always be greater than or equal to P when P < X 2 (b equals X2 , z,
or y in Figure 2). This implies that b 2 P, thus APP,-, = b 2 EST,-, = P. This is a
contradiction, so it must be the case that P > X2 if EST,-, > APP".
On the other hand, if EST,-, < APP" then P < X 2, meaning that the president
may have exercised some in uence on the nal appropriations APP,.,. As before,
rst suppose that this is false, that is, EST,-, < APP,-,, but P > X 2. If P > X 2,
then b = X2 (as in case 1). This implies that EST,-, = P > b = APP,.,. This is also
a contradiction, so it must be the case that P < X2 if EST" < APP,,. This proves
that we can use observed data, EST,-, and APP,.,, to determine if the president has
some in uence through possession of the veto.
A direct test of our hypothesis would be very simple. If the president preferred more appropriations for an agency than Congress did, the bill passed
would be identical to the congressional median, that is, IX2 — bl = 0. If he preferred less, however, he might be able to pull appropriations downward, and so
|X2 — b| > 0. Such a test, however, is precluded by our inability to observe the
median member’s ideal point X2. Nevertheless, the observable data do allow an
alternative method of testing the asymmetric in uence hypothesis. First, when
the president is in a strategically advantageous position (EST,, < APP,-,), the requests for appropriations he submits to Congress should have much greater bearing upon the amount of appropriations an agency ultimately receives than when
his position is weak. Assuming some estimation problems can be solved (more
on that shortly), regressing nal appropriations gures upon the president’s requests in the two strategic situations allows us to test this hypothesis by comparing the two coef cients that are thereby estimated.
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Second, we also know from previous analyses of federal budgetary data that
members’ preferences are determined, at the margin, by several political and
economic variables. Because congressional preferences have less in uence on
the nal appropriations APP,, when the president holds a strategic advantage, we
hypothesize that these political and economic variables should also have less inuence upon agency appropriations.

Political and Economic Determinants of Congressional Preferences
Adopting the “electoral connection” perspective of Mayhew (1974), we assume that the decisions members of Congress (and the president) make concerning appropriations result from their desire for reelection. Funds appropriated to
agencies of the federal government serve this goal by buying goods and services
that bene t congressional and presidential constituents. Constituents in turn condition their support for members and the president, at least in part, upon their
degree of satisfaction with these bene ts and the costs of providing them. We
expect appropriations for any given program to yield declining marginal returns
in electoral support. To maximize their reelection prospects, then, members seek
spending levels that equate marginal returns in electoral support from spending
on programs to the marginal losses in support resulting from higher budgets.
Employing this electoral calculus, one would predict, in light of the strong
evidence that members’ electoral fates depend upon the state of the economy
(Kramer, 1971; Jacobson and Kernell, 1981), that appropriations decisions respond to major economic variables such as in ation and unemployment. Additionally, if voters discount past bene ts and future costs, Congress could be expected to “heap” policy bene ts late in the electoral calendar (Tufte, 1978).
We would also expect appropriations decisions to re ect the propensity of
Democrats to prefer higher spending in the domestic realm than Republicans; the
larger the percentage of Democrats in Congress, the faster agency budgets should
grow. Although it might seem to some that party differences r11n contrary to an
electoral connection model—“party” and “constituency” have traditionally
been viewed as alternative, often contradictory sources of in uence upon legislators—party and constituency pressures coincide far more often than not. Even
though the congressional districts represented by Democrats often resemble other
districts that have Republican representatives, the reelection constituencies of
Democratic and Republican members of Congress do reliably differ (Fiorina,
1974; Fenno, 1978; Poole and Rosenthal, 1983). The tendency for Democrats to
support more spending for domestic programs can be attributed, at least in part,
to differences between Democratic and Republican constituencies.
As we indicated earlier, these hypotheses have garnered considerable support in previous analyses of federal budgetary data. Congress does appear to act
in accord with the Keynesian prescription of increased spending as a remedy for
unemployment and decreased spending for in ation (Kiewiet and McCubbins,
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1985a, 1985b; Kamlet and Mowery, 1985). Previous studies have also found that
the rate of domestic spending increases with the Democratic share of the membership and that Congress treats agency requests more generously in election
years than in nonelection years (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1985a, 1985b; Lowery,
Bookheimer, and Malachowski, 1985).
The hypothesis that we intend to test here, however, is that these various
political and economic determinants of congressional preferences have a signi cantly larger effect upon nal appropriations gures when Congress is in a strategically favorable position. It is to this effort that we now turn.

4. Data and Estimation
The data we compiled in order to test the asymmetric in uence hypothesis
were the presidential funding requests (submitted to Congress in the form of
OMB budget estimates) and the nal appropriations gures for 43 federal agencies from scal 1948 to 1979 (see Appendix A for data sources). Most of these
agencies were in Fenno’s (1966) sample. The additional agencies were either
public works agencies, which we have examined in some detail elsewhere (Kiewiet and McCubbins, l985a), or regulatory agencies. These 43 represent a large
sample of important domestic agencies that are funded through regular appropriations acts.
The regression framework we adopted was the “switching regime” model
(Madalla, 1977). This technique enables us to estimate separate coef cients for
our variables in the two different strategic situations. The basic form of the equation to be estimated is as follows:

APR‘:

=

'Y1lC1+ B11 ESTH 7' .8|2DEMz + B13E:+ 3141]: + 3151:]
+ 72102 + .321ESTn + B22DEM: + 323E: + 324 U: +
BZSII] + 8,‘,

(1)

c, and C2 = constant terms.
a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 when EST $ APP,—,,
thus indexing the regime in which the president is in a strategically favorable position.‘
y2 = a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 when EST" > APP,.,,
thus indexing the regime in which the president is in a strategically weak

'y, =

,.,

position.
‘In 6 percent of the cases in our sample, EST,-, = APP ,-,. We assigned these cases to the regime
in which the president was in a strategically favorable position. Our model implies that if Congress
actually preferred to appropriate less than the president, there would be no reason for them to come
up to the gure the president requested. In contrast, the president could potentially pull congressional
appropriations down to the gure he requested. This decision also turned out not to matter much, in
that our ndings survived intact when we reestimated the equation after omitting the cases where
EST,, = APP,-,.
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APP,-, = the appropriations awarded by Congress to agency 1" in scal year t.
EST,, = the appropriations requested by the president (in the form of the
OMB estimate) for agency 1" in scal year t.
DEM, = the percentage of seats on the House Appropriations Committee
held by Democrats.
E, = 1 during election years (the second session of each Congress), 0 otherwise. Appropriations decisions concern the upcoming scal year, so appropriations considered by Congress during election years are for oddnumbered scal years.
U,_, = the average rate of unemployment during the rst six months of the
session of Congress in which appropriations for a given scal year are
considered?
,- 1 = the (annualized) percentage of change in the Consumer Price Index
I
during the rst six months of the session of Congress in which appropriations for a given scal year are considered.
3,, = an error term subsuming all unmeasured factors.

Equation 1 speci es congressional appropriations decisions as a function of
presidential requests and several other variables. We expected the errors produced in predicting congressional decisions to be correlated with the president’s
requests. It was therefore necessary to model EST as an endogenous variable
and to employ an instrumental variables technique.“
Our most serious estimation problem, however, stems from speci cation of
the regime dummies, y, and y2. The value of the regime dummies, of course,
depends upon whether EST,, < APP,.,. The problem is that EST,, and APP,.,
are endogenous, which implies in turn that the regime dummies are endogenous (Madalla, 1977). Consequently, an initial instrumental variables procedure

,,

5Although previous research in this area provides no suggestions as to what time frame on the
economic variables is appropriate, research on economic conditions and voting behavior has yielded
considerable evidence that (a) voters respond retrospectively to past conditions and (b) their memories tend to be quite short (Fair, 1978). If members of Congress are like voters, the previous six
months time frame dominates plausible alternatives. Whatever the case, considerable variation in the
speci cation of the time frame of the economic variables had little affect upon the estimation results.
“The instrumental variables estimate of EST,, was created by imposing exclusionary restrictions, that is, regressing them on the same exogenous variables that APP" was regressed on plus at
least one additional variable, and using the tted values in the equation. In this instance we actually
speci ed several additional variables-—dummy variables for the party of the president, for presidential election years, for war years (Korean War, FY 1952-54, and Vietnam, FY 1967-74), and the
unemployment and in ation rates during the six months prior to the president’s submission of the
budget. This model was thus strictly overidenti ed. Coef cients derived from estimating an equation
very similar to this rst—stage equation are reported in Kiewiet and McCubbins (l985a). The instrument we constructed for the OMB request in equation 1 was only adequate, in that the correlation
between our estimate and the actual value was only about 0.4. Estimation of equation 1 with ordinary
least squares, however, yielded results that are substantively equivalent to the instrumental results
we report.
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on the regime dummies is required if consistent and asymptotically ef cient
estimates are to be obtained. In the procedure we adopted, 7, and 72 were replaced by probability estimates derived from an instrumental logit regression of
'y, (y2 = 1 — 'y 1) on all the exogenous variables in our equation (see Appendix
B for details).
An unfortunate feature of our data is the small number of observations for
each agency: the full time series is only 32 years long, and some agencies existed
for a far shorter period. Pooling data across the 43 agencies in the sample is thus
an attractive option. Besides offering a gain in statistical leverage, it simpli es
the test of our hypothesis: only a single test statistic need be calculated in order to
test our hypothesis of asymmetric in uence.

One risk associated with pooling is the possibility of cross—sectional correlation, which may downwardly bias our estimates of the standard errors. However,
an examination of the covariances of the error terms generated in estimation of
equation 1 between all pairs of agencies showed only a few were signi cant.
There was some suggestion that the errors were correlated, to a mild extent,
across programs in the Department of Interior billand across independent regulatory agencies. By not taking account of the covariation across programs in these
bills, our estimates are likely to be somewhat inef cient, though only mildly so.
Corrections, however, are made complicated by the endogenous switching model
we employed.
Pooling cross-sections can also introduce heteroscedastic error variances,
again resulting in inef cient estimates. A battery of test statistics on the residuals
produced in estimating equation 1 suggested that there was indeed a signi cant
degree of heteroscedasticity resulting primarily from large differences in the
magnitudes of agency appropriations gures.
We chose to correct this problem by dividing OMB estimates and nal appropriations gures by the appropriations gures for the preceding scal year and
then taking the log of this ratio. This transformation results in gures that are
similar to percentage changes, but that are more symmetric about 1.00. This is
important, given the distortions that are present with percentage changes; moving
from 100 to 300, for example, is a 300 percent increase, while moving from 300
to 100 is only a 66 percent decrease. The same battery of tests showed that the
heteroscedasticity problem was dramatically reduced, but not entirely eliminated. No other technique—generalized least squares, de ators, a standard 10gistic transformation—-did better in reducing heteroscedasticity than did the
transformation we employed. We suspect that the remaining heteroscedasticity is
a result of our endogenous switching, and therefore no common transformation
would solve the problem. Further, the degree of heteroscedasticity is very minor
and should not produce too much inef ciency in our estimates. Whatever the
case, our substantive results were robust to the transformation used.
Last, additional tests on the errors produced in estimating equation 1 show
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that our results were not compromised by implicit linear restrictions resulting
from pooling, serial correlation, or omitted variables collinear with our included
variables. Results of these tests are available upon request.

5. Results
We have hypothesized that the president has much greater in uence on congressional appropriations decisions when he prefers to spend less than Congress
rather than more. In estimating equation 1, we thus predict ,8” > B2,. We also
expect the political and economic determinants of congressional preferences to
have a much larger in uence upon agency appropriations when Congress is in a
strategically favorable position. Thus, we expect [322 > 3,2, 323 > [$13, {$24 >
,8 ,4, and B25 > 315. We test these hypotheses jointly.
In order to facilitate interpretation of the other coef cients, the unemployment, in ation, and partisancomposition variables entered the equations as deviations from their mean values during this period. Results are reported in Table 1,
Superscripts 1 and 2 denote the regime: 1 if EST,, s APP ,,; 2 if EST > APP
The results reported in Table 2 provide strong support for our hypotheses.
The estimated effect of the president’s (OMB) request upon the nal appropriations gure was much larger when the president was in a strategically favorable
position than when he was not. The large difference between the two EST coef -

,,

TABLE 1

Presidential In uence in the
Congressional Appropriations Process, FY 1948-79
(Instrumental Variables Estimates)

Variable
c1

c2

EST,‘,"
EST,2,*
DEM,‘
DEM,’
E,‘
E}
I,‘_,

1,2,,
U}_1
U,’_,

Estimate

Standard
Error

.058
—.011
1.01
.461
.008
.197
—.016
.034
.003
.001
—.004
.017

.025
.014
.210
.091
.169
.071
.016
.009
.003
.002
.006
.005

Nona: n = 1,230.

*Endogenous variable.

t

Ratio

2.31
-0.83
4.81
5.10
0.05
2.78
0.97
3.51
0.98
0.55
0.69
3.70

,,.
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cients was signi cant at the .01 level. Similarly, the percentage of Democrats
appeared to matter only when it was the Congress who held the upper hand; the
.197 coef cient indicates that a 10 percent increase in the number of Democrats
would produce about a 2 percent gain, ceteris paribus, in appropriations for the
agencies in our sample. The coef cient for the DEM,‘ term, in contrast, was virtually zero.7 Election years followed the same pattern; while election year “spend—
ing moods” appeared to have garnered these agencies about 3 percent more than
they received in off years when the strategic situation favored Congress, they
bene ted very little when congressional action was constrained by the preferences of the president. Unemployment appears to have mattered little in determining congressional preferences in situations when the president possesses
some in uence over the budget choice, though it was a signi cant factor when
Congress was in a strategically advantageous position. By contrast, the coef cients for in ation were insigni cant in both regimes. Our results thus support
our joint hypothesis on these coef cients.
Strictly speaking, our model implies that [32, = 0, that is, the president has
no in uence at all when in a strategically weak position. The estimated coef cient, however, was .461 and signi cant, indicating that the president possesses
some in uence even in cases when he prefers more than the congressional choice.
As discussed earlier, there are many potential sources of in uence over and
above that provided by the veto. In uence may arise through the exercise of informal powers, or may re ect the fact that appropriations are passed not as line
items, but as a small number of appropriations bills. Our results, however, allow
us only to speculate as to the mix of factors involved.
6. Discussion
Partisan Implications.‘ Are Republicans Stronger Presidents?

The results reported in Table 2 reveal that presidential requests have much
more in uence upon nal appropriations gures when the president desires to
spend less than Congress than when he would rather spend more. The general
tendency for Democratic presidents to favor higher levels of domestic spending
than Republicans favor implies that, in this arena at least, Republicans tend to be
“stronger” presidents. Figure 3, which for each scal year plots the percentage
of cases from our sample in which the president was favored by his proximity to
the reversionary expenditure, supports this suggestion.
Although our time series ends a few years prior to the beginning of the
Reagan administration, budgetary trends since 1981 are entirely consistent with
the implications of our model. Armed with a credible veto threat, President
7In previous analyses we used the percentage of Democrats in the House of Representatives.
When oor gures were substituted for committee gures, however, the estimated coef cients were
nearly identical.
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FIGURE 3

Percentage of Cases in Which the President’s
Position Was Strategically Favorable (ESTH s APP”)
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Reagan has enjoyed a large measure of success in restraining expenditures for
nonentitlement domestic programs. Our model also implies, however, that his
desire for large increases in defense spending grants Congress the strategic advantage in this area. If so, the rate of defense spending growth over the past four
years has been more a function of congressional preferences than of the preferences of Ronald Reagan or Caspar Weinberger. This would seem to be the case.
After granting almost all of the 26 percent increase the administration sought for
scal 1982, Congress has appropriated amounts that are farther and farther below
the administration’s requests. In response to the request for a 17 percent increase
in defense spending for scal 1986, Congress enacted an increase of 1 percent.

Implicationsfor the Study of Presidential Vetoes
In recent years several time series analyses have attempted to account for
the frequency with which different presidents cast vetoes, as well as for the frequency of successful and unsuccessful override attempts (Copeland, 1983; Rohde
and Simon, 1985; Hoff, 1985). These variables have been modeled as depending
upon the major parties’ shares in Congress, stages of the electoral cycle, the state
of the economy, and other exogenous variables. The evidence yielded by these
studies is valuable but limited, for it is not necessary for the president actually to
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exercise the veto in order to in uence legislation. As indicated above, the threat
of a veto, if credible, will induce Congress to incorporate the president’s preferences into legislation as it is pending. Indeed, in this study the in uence wielded
by the president, by virtue of the veto option, was measured in appropriations
legislation that the president did not veto, but rather signed into law.
Furthermore, to the extent that the president and Congress have full information about the rules of the game and each others preferences, vetoes should
never occur. Again, the absence of vetoes does not imply a lack of presidential
in uence over appropriations, or, as is frequently alleged, that Congress has abdicated its spending responsibilities to the president. Rather, it means that the
president has anticipated congressional preferences and that Congress has accommodated his wishes (Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, 1966; Kiewiet and
McCubbins, 1985a).
This line of reasoning also suggests that vetoes which do occur are exercises
in position taking. Congress may pass legislation knowing beforehand that the
president will veto it in order to take a position on some issue. In legislation concerning appropriations vetoes rarely come as a surprise; presidents almost always
warn Congress that a veto is forthcoming. Similarly, the presidents may veto a
bill in the face of a congressional override in order to take a position. In any
event, the reasons we expect a veto or an override are different from those generally studied in the literature. Analyzing presidential in uence as a function of the
credibility of a veto threat yields a richer, more comprehensive View of what possession of the veto means to the president.
Manuscript submitted 19 September 1986
Final manuscript received 26 May 1987
APPENDIX A
Data Sources
Presidential budget requests (in the form of OMB estimates) and nal appropriations gures
are reported in the Annual Senate Document Appropriations, Budget Estimates, Etc., the section
entitled “Itemized Comparisons of Budget Estimates and Appropriations Arranged by Senate Acts.”
Both sets of gures were reported in various regular annual appropriations acts. In a few instances
several line items that customarily appeared under an agency in the regular annual appropriations act
did not, but appeared instead in a subsequent supplemental act. In these cases these appropriations
were counted toward the agency’s funding for that year. In all other cases the funds appropriated in
de ciency and supplemental acts were for line items already covered in the regular annual act. These
gures were almost always very small, and were not included in the following analyses.
Unemployment and Consumer Price Index gures were taken from issues of the Monthly Labor
Review, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor.
Information on presidential vetoes of appropriation bills was taken from Presidential Vetoes,
1789-1976, Of ce of the Secretary of the Senate, and from the 1977-79 issues of the Congressional
Quarterly Almanac.
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Sample of Federal Agencies, FY 1948-79
Extension Service
Bureau of Standards (1948-73)
Farmers Home Administration
Patent Of ce
Rural Electrification Admin.
Weather Bureau (1948-66)
Soil Conservation Service
Bureau of Labor Statistics
Forest Service
Bureau of Labor Standards (1948-68)
Bureau of Land Management
Census Bureau
National Park Service
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Imm. and Naturalization Service
Fish & Wildlife Service (1948-71)
Federal Prison System
Bureau of Mines (1948-74)
Bureau of Narcotics (1948-69)
Bonneville Power Admin. (1949-75)
Bureau of Customs
Of ce of Education
Bureau of the Public Debt
Public Health Service (1948-69)
Secret Service
Of ce of Voc. Rehab. (1948-68)
Internal Revenue Service
Bureau of Reclamation
Bureau of the Mint
Corps of Engineers
Food and Drug Administration
Military Construction (1960-79)
Civil Aeronautics Board
Economic Dev. Admin. (1966-79)
Federal Power Commission
Securities and Exchange Commission
Interstate Commerce Commission
Federal Trade Commission
Federal Communications Commission
Geological Survey
Coast & Geodetic Survey (1948-66)
NASA (1960-79)
NOTE: Most agencies in this sample existed continuously from FY 1948 through FY 1979. If
they did not, the years in which they were in existence are reported.

APPENDIX B
Nonlinear First-Stage Estimation of Regimes
In equation 1 the coef cients of the righthand—side variables are allowed to vary across the two
strategic “regimes”: y, = 1 when EST,, $ APP,,; y; = 1 — y, = 1 when EST,, > APP,,. The
exogenous variables in equation 1 affect the regime probabilities as well as the value of APP,,. If
more Democrats on the House Appropriations Committee cause higher appropriations, for example,
they will also increase the probability that Congress prefers to appropriate more than the president.
and thus that y, = 1. This can lead to biased and inef cient estimates.
Dubin (1985) shows that one solution to this problem is to replace the regime dummies (which
take on values of only 1 or 0), with unbiased probability estimates of their values. These can be derived from a nonlinear regression of y, on all the exogenous variables in equation 1, including those
in the instrumental variables list for EST,~,. These additional variables, as mentioned in footnote 4,
were as follows:
U!/_1 = the unemployment rate during the previous six months prior to the president’s submission of budget requests to Congress.
1521 = the in ation rate during the previous six months prior to the president’s submission of
budget requests to Congress.
DEMI,’ = a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if the president is a Democrat, 0

otherwise.

E5’ = a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 in presidential election years, 0 otherwise.
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TABLE B.l
Nonlinear (Logit) Estimates
of Endogenous Switching Regime Dummies
(Maximum Likelihood Estimates)

Variable*
fgl
7_1

DEMf
E,‘

U511

15:,

DEM?
E5’
K
VN

Estimate

Std. Error

5.54
-0.42
0.05
-5.21
-0.14
0.04
0.05
1.20
-0.25
0.51
-0.45

0.94
0.10
0.05
1.67
0.22
0.10
0.03
0.18
0.26
0.45
0.21

t

Ratio
5.91
4.10
1.15
3.12
0.66
0.45
1.46
6.76
0.96
1.12
2.20

NOTE: ‘This equation also speci ed several dummy variables which registered the particular appropriations bill in which
the agency was included. Maximum likelihood estimates associated with these dummies are not reported.
n = 1,230

Auxiliary statistics
Log likelihood
Percentage correctly
predicted

at convergence

at zero

—556.9

—852.6

78.7

50.0

statistics about zero
Likelihood ratio index
0.3468
Likelihood ratio statistic 591.4

Goodness-of- t

K = a dummy variable for appropriations considered during the Korean War years ( scal
1952-54).

VN = a dummy variable for appropriations considered during the American combat presence
in the Vietnam War ( scal l967—74).

The logit equation also speci ed several dummy variables to re ect the particular appropriations bill
in which the agency was included. This was done primarily to improve goodness of t.
Results of this logit estimation are reported in Table B. 1. The strongest effects are those associated with partisanship. Compared to Republicans, Democratic presidents were likely to prefer more
spending than Congress, putting them at a strategic disadvantage. Conversely, more Democrats on
the House Appropriations Committee made Congress more likely to prefer higher appropriations than
the president, thus putting him at a strategic advantage.
The replacement of y, and y; with unbiased probability estimates also alleviates censoring
problems in our data (Maddala, I977). Censoring arises from a data partition created by our regime
dummies: in regime 1, all observations of EST,-, are less than or equal to the dependent variable
APP ,«,, while all observations of EST” in regime 2 are greater than the corresponding value of APP ,-,.
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Our hypothesis that B ,1 > [321 would thus appear to be guaranteed (artifactually) by this partition.
We do not partition the data, however, since we use an unbiased likelihood estimate of the probability
that the president holds some in uence to weight all observations. Our logit estimation (described
above) yields the probability (between 0 and 1) that an observation falls into one partition (regime)
or the other. Further, this inequality would not necessarily hold as long as constant terms are speci ed
in the equation.
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